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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Should this Court reverse the Utah Court of Appeals 
and create a public policy exception to the Rule that 
contracts authorizing attorney's fees are strictly interpreted? 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
Attached hereto as Attachment 1 is a copy of the 
Order of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of 
the trial court denying an award of attorney's fees to 
Geraldine Baker Nelson. 
JURISDICTION 
The respondents acknowledge that this Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 78-2-2 and 
Title V of the Rules of this Court. 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
No statutes control this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
In the trial court, the Respondents, Paul and Penny 
Lochhead, sued the Defendant, Geraldine Baker Nelson, 
alleging that she had breached specific written warranties 
containpd in thn Uniform Roal F.st-af-p Con*-rart. Th^ matter 
was tried to a jury which determined in its special 
verdict, attached as an Exhibit to Appellant's Petition 
for Writ of Certiorari that there was not a breach of 
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contract or warranty by Mrs. Nelson. The trial court 
ruled that since there was no breach, Mrs. Nelson did not 
fall within the coverage of the attorney's fees provision 
contained in the Uniform Real Estate Contract and denied 
her fee petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
The reason the Court of Appeals denied Nelson's 
appeal and affirmed the trial court is evident from 
Nelson's argument. Nelson's argument is essentially that 
as a matter of public policy, the Court ought to abandon 
the American rule on attorney's fees and engraft an 
all-encompassing attorney's fees provision onto each 
contract where there is reference to attorney's fees in 
any provision. 
The Court of Appeals, in affirming the trial court, 
relied upon its holding in Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 
764 P.2d 985 (Utah App. 1988). In Dixie State Bank, the 
Court of Appeals relied upon prior holdings of this Court 
in Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) and 
Trainer _y._Cushjngf 680 P.2H 8S6 (n» ah 1984). All nf 
those cases star 3 for the proposition that attorney's fees 
provisions will be strictly construed. 
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The position Mrs. Nelson would have this Court take 
is that the Courts should remake parties1 contracts for 
them if they fail, in retrospect, to get appropriate 
language in the contract in the first instance. It is of 
note that the Uniform Real Estate Contract in this 
particular case was prepared by and closed at a title 
company. Had Mrs. Nelson wished to have language in the 
contract other than she had, she could very easily have 
asked the title officer to resolve those problems for her, 
she did not. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals properly relied on current Utah 
law enunciated by the Utah Court of Appeals in reliance 
upon this Court's decisions. Nelson's Petition for 
Certiorari should be denied. 
DATED this A ^ day of June, 1989. 
espondents 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy o 
foregoing document was deposited in the United States 
Mail, postage prepaid, on the / day of June, 1989, 
addressed to the following: 
Steven F. Alder 
220 East 3900 South 
Suite 16 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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IN THE 
ATTACHMENT NO. 1 
F I L E D 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS y AP§&//-,?C? 
0 0 O 0 0 ' .. j 
Paul R. Lochhead and Penny 
Lochhead, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
v. 
Geraldine Baker Nelson, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
V 
ORDER 
Case No. 880508-CA 
Before Judges Davidson, Jackson and Orme (On Rule 31 Hearing). 
This matter is before the court pursuant to Rule 31, Rules 
of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the judgment of the trial court 
denying an award of attorneys' fees to Geraldine Baker Nelson 
(Case No. 880508-CA) is affirmed, and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the judgment of the trial court 
on Geraldine Baker Nelson's counterclaim for taxes (Case No. 
880568-CA) is affirmed. 
DATED this / 3 day of April, 1989. 
FOR THE COURT: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of April, 1989, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Order was mailed to each of the 
following: 
Steven F, Alder 
Cheryl M. Brower 
Attorneys at Law 
220 East 3900 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 
Robert H. Wilde 
Attorney at Law 
6925 Union Park Center, Suite 490 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Hon. Kenneth Rigtrup 
Third District Court 
Salt Lake County 
#C86-506 
/ 
Julia C. Whitfield 
Case Management Clerk 
#16 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAUL R. LOCHHEAD- and PENNY 
LOCHHEAD, 
Plaintiffs/Respondents, 
vs. 
GERALDINE BAKER NELSON, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
: Case No. 880508 CA 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On a special verdict the jury decided against the 
Lochheads. Nelson sought attorney's fees for work 
performed in the case. The trial court ruled that fees 
were not available except as they were related to the 
prosecution of Nelson's counterclaim alleging a breach of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract for failure to pay reaJ 
estate taxes. Nelson appeals that ruling. 
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Nelson asserts that the trial court erred in not 
awarding her attorney's fees for time spent in defending a 
breach of contract claim, a fraud claim, and for time 
spent in prosecuting a slander of title action which was 
withdrawn prior to trial. The Lochheads believe that 
the trial court was correct in allowing attorney's fees 
only where authorized by statute or contract and that the 
contracts authorizing attorney's fees are strictly 
interpreted. Further, there was insufficient evidence 
presented to the trial court to allow the award of 
attorney fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Lochheads (Plaintiffs) sued Geraldine and Keith 
Nelson (Defendants) for breach of contract under a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract the parties had executed wherein the 
Lochheads were buyers and the Nelsons were sellers, (R 
2-19). The Lochheads also included a cause of action 
alleging fraud, (R 6). During the course of the 
litigation Keith Nelson filed bankruptcy and was removed 
as a Defendant in the action. Later the Lochheads filed 
a Lis Pendens, (R 144). Mrs. Nelson then filed a 
counterclaim alleging that the Lis Pendens slandered hr>r 
title, (R 165). Prior to the commencement of trial, Mrs. 
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Nelson withdrew her counterclaim for slander of title, (R 
307). The matter was tried to the jury. The jury 
answered special interrogatories which were submitted to 
them, having been prepared by Mrs. Nelson's counsel. The 
jury found that there was no breach of the contract, (R 
267, 294, 295). 
At a post-trial hearing Mrs. Nelson's counsel 
testified at some length about the attorney's fees which 
had been incurred in her representation, (R 315-341). In 
that testimony he broke down his attorney's fees based 
upon time allegedly used in prosecuting his tax 
counterclaim, but failed to further break down the 
attorney's fees. In other words, there was no accounting 
of attorney's fees showing time spent defending the 
Plaintiffs' contract claim as opposed to defending the 
Plaintiffs' fraud claim, nor was there any brejik down 
showing time involved in prosecution of the slander of 
title counterclaim. The time was essentially identified 
in two categories, tax counterclaim time and other time. 
The tria] court awarded Mrs. Nelson $480.00 in attorney's 
fees and she appealed, claiming that she was entitled to 
$14,000.00 in fees. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. There are no attorney's fees available to Mrs. 
Nelson for defending the fraud complaint or asserting the 
Lis Pendens counterclaim because there is no contractual 
or statutory basis for these attorney's fees. 
2. There are no attorney's fees available to Mrs. 
Nelson for defending the breach of contract allegation 
because there is no statutory or contractual basis for 
these fees. The contractual provision awards attorney's 
fees in the event of a default and the jury specifically 
found there was no default. 
3. There is insufficient evidence upon which to 
base an award of attorney's fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THERE IS NO STATUTORY OR CONTRACTUAL BASIS FOR 
ATTORNEY'S FEES FOR DEFENDING THE FRAUD COMPLAINT OR 
PROSECUTING THE LIS PENDENS COUNTERCLAIM. 
It has long been established law in Utah that 
attorney's fees are available only if there is a statutory 
or contractual authorization for fees, Utah Farm 
Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 
(Utah 1981). At the evidenciary hearing on Mrs. Nelson's 
claim for attorney's fees, counsel was asked, on 
cross-examination, if he was aware of a statutory or 
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contractual authorization for attorney's fees on the fraud 
or slander of title issues. His response was negative. 
Utah Code Anno. § 78-27-56, as in effect at the time 
this matter was tried, authorized attorney's fees for 
actions brought in bad faith. The Court specifically 
found that the fraud allegations were not brought in bad 
faith belying Nelson's claim, at page 8 of her brief, that 
Lochheads action was frivolous. The slander of title 
counterclaim was voluntarily dropped by the Defendant and, 
accordingly, cannot be the basis for attorney's fees 
because there were no findings which would indicate that 
the Lis Pendens was filed inappropriately, in bad faith, 
nor did Mrs. Nelson prevail on that issue. In short, 
there is no basis in statute or contract for an award of 
attorney's fees on either of those elements of this 
lawsuit. 
II. 
ATTORNEY'S FEES ARE NOT AVAILABLE FOR DEFENDING THE 
BREACH OF CONTRACT CLAIM ASSERTED BY THE PLAINTIFFS. 
Paragraph 4 of the Uniform Real Estate Contract at 
issue in this lawsuit provides, 
"Attorney's Fees. Both parties agree that, 
should any party default in any of the 
covenants or agreements contained herein, the 
prevailing party in litigation shall be 
entitled to all costs and expenses, including 
a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise 
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or accrue from enforcing or terminating this 
contract, or in obtaining possession of the 
property, or in pursuing any remedy provided 
hereunder or by applicable law." 
The fact that there happens to be an attorney's 
fees provision in the contract does not mean that 
any party prevailing in a lawsuit automatically is 
entitled to attorney's fees. This is exactly the 
same issue which was raised in Trayner v. Cushing, 
688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984). There the Court 
said, 
"Counsel for both parties cite and discuss 
cases awarding attorney's fees to the 
'prevailing party' or to the party 'not in 
default'. Neither of these phrases was used 
in the agreement before us. These parties 
have agreed instead to the payment of 
attorney's fees in an action brought to 
'enforce' the agreement 'or any right arising 
out of a breach thereof." 
Since Cushing this principle has been upheld no less 
than twice by this court. In Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 
P.2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986) and in Cooper v. Deseret 
Federal Savings & Loan Association, 86 Adv. Rep. 26, 28 
(Utah App. 1988). Cooper was decided after the decision 
in the court below and cited by Mrs. Nelson in her 
docketing statement but not in her brief. 
The contract allows attorney's fees "should any party 
default". The jury found that no party defaulted. The 
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attorney's fees authorized by the contract are those for 
". . . enforcing or terminating . . . obtaining possession 
of the property . . . or pursuing any remedy . . . " Mrs. 
Nelson's attorney's fees were not expended in any such 
pursuit. 
The extremely clear point set forth by the Cushing 
line of cases is that attorney's fees language in 
contracts will be strictly construed. That strict 
construction prevents Mrs. Nelson from claiming more 
attorney's fees than the court has awarded. 
III. 
THERE WAS INADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT ANY AWARD OF 
ATTORNEY'S FEES. 
The evidence provided by Mrs. Nelson in her quest for 
attorney's fees was in the nature of testimony provided by 
her attorney and an exhibit consisting of his bills to 
her. Noteably a transcription of that testimony was not 
provided by Nelson in asserting her position before this 
Court. Neither the bills nor Nelson's counsel's testimony 
broke his time down into the areas of representation 
covered. It is impossible from either his testimony or 
from the exhibit to identify time which dealt only with 
the defense of the breach of contract claim. That claim 
is the only claim whichr by any remote stretch of the 
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imagination, could support an attorney's fees award. 
Though there is no justification for an award of 
attorney's fees on that claim either as argued in the 
preceding section. In Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 
624 (Utah 1985) the Supreme Court said, 
" . . . a party who is entitled to 
attorney's fees costs and fails to ask 
for all of them in the trial phase of the 
case, or fails to adduce adequate 
evidence in support of a finding of 
reasonable attorney's fees, waives any 
right to claim those fees later." 
In order to meet this burden Mrs. Nelson would have 
had to have adduced at the hearing evidence to allow the 
trial court to answer and make findings of fact on four 
questions. 
"1. What legal work was actually performed? 
2. How much of the work performed was reasonably 
necessary to adequately prosecute the matter? 
3. Is the attorney's billing rate consistent with 
the rates customarily charged in the locality for 
similar services? 
4. Are there circumstances which require 
consideration of additional factors, including those 
listed in the Code of Professional Responsibility?" 
Dixie State Bank v. Bracken, 94 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5 
(Utah App. 1988) 
In Cabrera, at 624, the Court said, 
"Reasonable attorney's fees are not measured 
by what an attorney actually bills, nor is 
the number of hours spent on the case 
determinative in computing fees . . . . The 
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Court may consider, among other factors, the 
difficulty of the litigation, the efficiency 
of the attorneys in presenting the case, the 
reasonc bleness of the number of the hours 
spent on the case, the fee customarily 
charged in the locality for similar services, 
the amount involved in the case and the 
result attained, and the expertise and 
experience of the attorneys involved." 
No evidence was adduced in the hearing which would 
have provided a basis for a finding on the majority of 
the Cabrera issues. 
Even if there were, by some stretch of the 
imagination, an entitlement to fees, there is no adequate 
evidence which would allow the award of those fees or 
which would make it possible for the court to determine a 
reasonable fee. 
IV. 
UTAH PRECEDENT SUPPORTS LOCHHEADfS POSITION. 
Nelson urges this court to adopt positions taken, on 
various issues, by courts in Texas and Colorado as well 
as in dissenting and concurring opinions in Utah cases. 
Utah case law clearly covers all the issues in this 
matter, as shown above. 
In Dixie State Bank, supra, at 5, this Court 
addressed all of the matters at issue in this case in 
Lochheads favor. 
In Utah, attorney fees are awarded only if 
authorized by statute or by contract. [citation 
omitted] If provided for by contract, the award of 
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attorney fees is allowed only in accordance with the 
terms of the contract. [citation omitted] [Where 
the] contract was not subject litigation, contract 
provision allowing attorney fees was not applicable 
. . . . Calculation of reasonable attorney fees is 
in the sound discretion of the trial court, 
[citation omitted] and will not be overturned in the 
absence of a showing of a clear abuse of discretion, 
[citation omitted] However, an award of attorney 
fees must be supported by evidence in the record, 
[citation omitted] Award of attorneys fees must 
generally be made on the basis of findings of fact 
supported by the evidence and appropriate 
conclusions of law. [citation omitted] Since party 
did not present evidence on issue of attorney fees 
at trial, trial court did not commit error in 
declining to make an award." 
The Lochheads suggest that Dixie State Bank is 
dispositive of all issues in Nelson's appeal other than 
Lochheads' claim for attorney fees on appeal. 
V. 
LOCHHEADS SHOULD BE AWARDED THEIR ATTORNEY FEES IN 
DEFENDING THIS APPEAL. 
Lochheads previously filed a motion seeking attorney 
fees in this action- In that motion they cited Nelson to 
the very clear case law argued in the preceding sections 
of this brief. Since that motion, but before Nelson filed 
her brief, in this action this court decided Dixie State 
Bank, supra, which shows that Lochheads position 
represents the law in Utah. Despite this Nelson 
persisted. 
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Nelson has failed to provide this court with a 
transcription of her counsel's testimony at the hearing 
on attorney fees despite the fact that both Cabrera and 
Dixie State Bank require such evidence in order for this 
court to rule on the reasonableness of the attorney fees 
award, or lack thereof below. Without such a record 
Nelson has absolutely no hope of prevailing on appeal. 
Lochheads1 claim for attorney fees on appeal is 
governed by Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. That rule was interpreted in O'Brien v. Rush, 
774 P.2d 306, 310 (Utah App. 1987) 
"For purpose of Rule 33(a) of the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeals we define a "frivolous appeal" as 
one having no reasonable legal or factual basis as 
defined in Rule 40(a) . . . . 
It may be argued that the imposition of this 
definition creates a lesser standard than that 
created by Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1981) which 
requires lack of good faith. We do not disagree. 
However, since a party has already been to court 
once and has had the benefit of one ruling, the 
decision to appeal should be reached only after 
careful consideration by the party and counsel." 
Reading Rule 33(a) in conjunction with Rule 40(a) 
shows that the "no reasonable legal or factual basis" 
requirement is a disjunctive requirement, i.e., having 
either no legal basis or no factual basis renders an 
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appeal frivolous. Certainly an appeal on a well reasoned 
legal argument with no factual foundation is frivolous as 
is a set of facts showing substantial injury with no legal 
basis for recovery. 
In this case the Utah law to support Nelson's 
argument is clearly lacking. Dixie State Bank and its 
predecessors all hold that attorney's fees provisions in 
contracts will be strictly construed. The appeal is 
legally frivolous. 
Nelson's failure to identify at trial those items of 
work which might, by a broad stretch of the imagination, 
support an attorney fees award and her failure to provide 
this court with a transcript make the appeal factually 
frivolous. 
These legal and factual defects in Nelson's appeal 
require that Lochheads be awarded their attorney fees on 
appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
There was no legal basis for the attorney's fees 
Nelson now seeks. The trial court below was correct in 
its assessment of the case. The Lochheads should be 
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awarded their attorney's fees for having to defend this 
frivolous appeal. 
DATED this day of November, 1988. 
ROBERT H. WILDE 
Attorney for Respondents 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused four true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Respondent to be 
deposited in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Steven F Alder 
220 East 3900 South 
Suite 16 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Attorney for Appellant 
on this day of November, 1988. 
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